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Culpability in the criminal law has two principal meanings. In a broad sense,
it is more or less synonymous with moral blameworthiness. In a narrow sense, it
refers to MPC-style mental states (or, in the case of negligence, pseudo- or quasi-
mental states) that apply to elements in the actus reus. The articles in this
symposium-produced by some of the most creative and penetrating criminal law
theorists writing today-explore aspects of both forms of culpability, and the
relationships between them, across a diverse range of problems and puzzles. This
introduction briefly previews the seven contributions that follow.
Culpability in the narrow sense contributes to or partially determines
culpability in the broad sense. Presumptively, an actor who has narrow culpability
with regard to each material element of an offense is broadly culpable-i.e.,
blameworthy-and an actor who lacks narrow culpability with regard to each
material element is not broadly culpable-i.e., not blameworthy. But as Douglas
Husak reminds us in "Broad" Culpability and the Retributivist Dream,' this
biconditional is only presumptive. An actor who is narrowly culpable with regard
to each material element might not be blameworthy because, say, he did not
commit a voluntary act or has a valid defense of justification or excuse. An actor
who lacks narrow culpability with regard to one or more material elements might
be blameworthy because, say, the elements with respect to which he lacks narrow
culpability are not necessary for separating wrongful and blameworthy conduct
from neighboring conduct that would not be blameworthy.
Because narrow culpability is neither necessary nor sufficient for
blameworthiness, a full theory of the latter must address much besides the former.
Yet, Husak observes, while "[r]espectable progress has been made about narrow
culpability, . . . the remaining part of a theory of blame is radically under-
theorized." 2 His task, however, is not quite to supply all that remains to be done
on that score given the overwhelming complexity and difficulty of the project.
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2 Id. at 459. I said above that culpability in the broad sense is more or less synonymous with
blameworthiness. Husak might emphasize the "less," cautioning that "[e]ven when joined to a theory
of narrow culpability, a theory of broad culpability is a far cry from a comprehensive theory of
blame." Id. at 459. For purposes of this very brief and partial summary, I will ignore the components
of blameworthiness that, in Husak's estimation, lie outside not only of narrow culpability but of
broad culpability as well.
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Instead, the ambition of his important present paper is to make progress toward the
larger goal by focusing attention on one prominent desideratum that any adequate
theory of broad culpability must satisfy-namely, that each component must make
it possible "to conceptualize blame in shades of grey rather than simply in black or
white."
Husak develops this idea by applying it to five particular issues that fall
within the rubric of broad culpability: the defenses of justification and excuse; the
capacities for criminal responsibility; the voluntary act requirement; the relevance
or irrelevance of an actor's motives; and questions that arise when an actor lacks
awareness that his conduct is morally wrongful or criminally proscribed. This last
issue, Husak maintains, is the thorniest and the one of the five to which he devotes
the greatest attention, especially on the "radically under-theorized" variant of
ignorance of law (as distinct from the variant that we might label ignorance of
morality).4 In order to satisfy the desideratum that broad culpability be manifest in
degrees, he proposes that the structure of narrow culpability that applies to
mistakes of fact should be reproduced with respect to mistakes of law too. That is,
blameworthiness and thus punishment should vary depending on whether the actor
violated the law purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently, or non-negligently.
Kenneth Simons' contribution to this symposium, Ignorance and Mistake of
Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact,5 picks up just where Husak's leaves
off: on mistakes of law and their proper treatment relative to mistakes of fact.
Agreeing with Husak that the broad topic encompasses a host of sub-issues that are
not yet well understood, Simons focuses particularly on the notoriously tricky
problem of how the law should treat that class of mistakes variously described as
mistakes of "noncriminal," "different," or "collateral" law. Famously, this
problem has both exculpatory and inculpatory dimensions. That is, when an
element of an offense is satisfied but the actor believes otherwise because of
ignorance or mistake about the non-penal legal rule that makes that the case (say, a
rule from property law or marriage law), then the actor's mistake might properly
be treated just as a mistake of fact, warranting the actor's acquittal on grounds of
lack of (narrow) culpability. Conversely, when an offense element is not satisfied
but would be if the actor's mistaken belief about some non-penal legal rule were
correct, then his mistake might render him punishable for an attempt.
The questions that arise under these headings are too numerous, and Simons'
analyses too rich and complex, to permit easy encapsulation. That said, at least
three distinct contributions of his article should be identified. First, Simons sheds
light on the much-observed fact that the boundary between mistakes of criminal
law and of noncriminal law is vague or contestable. In particular, he distinguishes
three recurrent situations that warrant careful attention: when the criminal law
' Id. at 450.
4 Id. at 459.
Kenneth Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 487 (2012).
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incorporates a civil schedule of prohibited items, when the criminal law merely
criminalizes acts that a civil regulatory regime itself prohibits, and when a criminal
law term draws its meaning from both criminal law and noncriminal law. Second,
he denies that mistakes of noncriminal law must be treated either just like mistakes
of criminal law or just like mistakes of fact. Rather, he argues, "we should at least
contemplate whether to require a different level of culpability for each of the three
categories."6 Third, he powerfully undermines the assumption that mistakes of
noncriminal law must be treated symmetrically for inculpatory and exculpatory
purposes.
These three general ideas can be made more concrete with an example
supplied by Husak. "When I dispose of the drained batteries from my flashlight,"
he confesses, "I am vaguely aware that the rules in my jurisdiction might require
these batteries to be recycled in special containers. Am I right or wrong? I
honestly do not know."7 The answer, fortunate for Husak, is this: while New
Jersey law prohibits disposal of rechargeable batteries, the legal regulation of
single-use alkaline batteries varies by county; and Husak's home county of
Middlesex (the self-proclaimed "greatest county in the land," incidentally) permits
their ordinary disposal. Less fortunate for Husak is that his frank if injudicious
admission that he is aware of a risk that the law requires that his drained batteries
be recycled might make him susceptible to criminal punishment for the attempted
criminal disposal of batteries that. must be recycled. To resolve whether Husak
should be convictable on this theory, we might profitably attend to Simons'
analyses: first, of whether this is a mistake about criminal law or about the
noncriminal regulatory law governing waste disposal and recycling; second, if this
is a mistake of noncriminal. law, of what level of culpability should govern a
mistake of this sort in the exculpatory context; and third, of whether this is or is not
a case properly calling for symmetrical treatment of inculpatory and exculpatory
mistakes.
Very generally, mistakes of law (at least mistakes about governing law)
instantiate the possibility that a defendant might be narrowly culpable with respect
to all offense elements and yet not be blameworthy. Plausibly, the law's treatment
of voluntary intoxication exemplifies the converse possibility that one might be
blameworthy even when lacking narrow culpability with respect to all elements.
In particular, under what Gideon Yaffe dubs "the intoxication recklessness
principle," the law of many jurisdictions attributes recklessness-conscious
awareness of an unjustifiable risk-to a voluntarily intoxicated actor who lacks
such awareness. In effect the law punishes such voluntarily intoxicated actors for a
recklessness level of blameworthiness (or broad culpability) even though they lack
the narrow culpability of recklessness with regard to offense elements.
In Intoxication, Recklessness, and Negligence, Yaffe defends the intoxication
recklessness principle against its academic critics who worry that punishment in
6 Id. at 509.
Husak, supra note I at 482.
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the absence of narrow culpability results in punishment absent or in excess of
broad culpability.8 His defense, however, is only partial. After providing an
ingenious formal model of the ways that negligence and recklessness both
constitute and evidence blameworthiness, Yaffe explicates the conditions that must
be satisfied for the law to be warranted in attributing to non-reckless voluntarily
intoxicated actors a degree of blameworthiness usually associated with reckless
sober action.
Recall that one constituent of broad culpability that Husak discusses involves
an actor's motives for engaging in prohibited conduct, even holding narrow
culpability constant. For example, an actor who purposely causes the death of
another human being might be less blameworthy than he would otherwise be if he
is motivated either by compassion for the victim's suffering (euthanasia) or by
vengeance for the victim's own wrongdoing (provocation manslaughter). In
previous work, I have focused attention on a different way in which motives might
be relevant to the criminal law-namely, by helping to explain why certain
conduct the criminalization of which is puzzling might be criminally prohibited in
the first place. Specifically, I argued that the paradox of blackmail could be solved
by recognizing; that the fact that an actor has conditionally offered not to disclose
embarrassing information if paid to remain silent is ordinarily powerful (but not
conclusive) evidence that, were he subsequently to make the disclosure on failure
of payment, the actor would knowingly be causing harm without justificatory
motives; that such action is morally blameworthy; and that the law has ample
reason to criminalize blameworthy decisions to cause or risk harm.9 In Why the
Paradox of Blackmail is So Hard To Resolve,'0 Peter Westen carefully assesses
that proposed solution to the blackmail paradox, along with a slew of other extant
proposed solutions, and finds them all wanting.
Offering a five-part taxonomy of blackmail proposals-one informed by a far
more thorough investigation of the statutory landscape than is customary in the
theoretical literature-Westen argues that criminalization of four of the five is
entirely unproblematic. The blackmail paradox, he claims, arises only with regard
to proposals to disclose true, non-incriminating information about another that was
obtained without wrongfully intruding upon that person's privacy under
circumstances in which the disclosure would not be wrongful given "what is
known of the legitimate interests of the public or individual disclosees."" While
8 Gideon Yaffe, Intoxication, Recklessness and Negligence, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRM. L. 454
(2012).
9 Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65
U. CHI. L. REv. 795 (1998). More recently, I have offered a variant on that initial theory that focuses
not on the actor's motives, but rather on his beliefs. Mitchell N. Berman, Blackmail, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRiMINAL LAW 37 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011). I do
not, however, disavow the fundamentals of my earlier analysis.
1o Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail is So Hard To Resolve, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
585 (2012).
" Id. at 601.
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opining that my motive-based solution enjoys some advantages over most
competitors, Westen concludes that it fails for essentially the same reasons that, he
believes, doom the doctrine of double effect. Briefly: "The fact that someone is a
bad person who is worthy of contempt does not mean that he has committed a bad
act that is deserving of punishment. That an actor's evil purpose can aggravate the
blameworthiness of a completed wrong does not mean it can transform blameless
completed conduct into blameworthy completed conduct."l 2 Westen ends with the
provocative suggestion, long espoused by libertarians, that criminalization of his
category-five blackmail might not in fact be justifiable. People have been
socialized for generations to believe that such conduct is properly criminalized, he
allows. But if reason undermines those widespread beliefs, then perhaps they can
now be socialized to support its decriminalization.
Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan share with Westen the dominant view
among criminal law theorists that criminal punishment may justly be imposed only
for blameworthy conduct. But, they observe in Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive
Action,13 this principle, when combined with limits on the use of civil commitment,
produces a situation both "unsatisfactory and unstable." 4  While criminal
punishment is appropriate only for morally and legally responsible agents who
engage in blameworthy conduct, civil commitment of dangerous persons is
reserved for persons who are morally and legally nonresponsible. This leaves
society without an obvious means to protect itself from dangerous persons who are
not mentally ill and who have not yet committed culpable acts that would justify
the imposition of criminal punishment-persons Alexander and Ferzan dub
"responsible but dangerous." The right response to this gap in society's means for
self-protection, they argue, is to make greater use of "preemptive restrictions of
liberty" ("PRLs").
Full exploration of the possible variety of PRLs and the proper limitations on
their use is, inescapably, well beyond the scope of this one article. Yet one
illustration takes center stage: PRLs, Alexander and Ferzan argue, might serve as
useful and legitimate means to deal with incomplete attempts. Now, this
suggestion will surprise many readers unfamiliar with Alexander and Ferzan's past
work on this subject,'5 given the orthodox view that in a great many cases, though
surely not in all, incomplete attempts do constitute blameworthy conduct for which
criminal punishment would be fully justified. They believe otherwise. Their
controversial contrary position holds, in short, that an actor is blameworthy hence
justly punished only for "unleash[ing] a risk of harm that he believes he can no
12 Id. at 636.
13 Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics ofPreemptive Action, 9
OHio ST. J. CRIM. L. 637 (2012).
14 Id. at 638.
Alexander and Ferzan have put forth this view in several prior works, but most notably
(though not initially) in their much-discussed recent book, LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER
FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009).
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longer control (through... will and reason alone)," 6 and that incomplete attempts
do not satisfy this condition. A substantial portion of their co-authored article is
devoted to elaborating and defending this heterodox claim against their critics.
Whereas her jointly authored contribution to this symposium starts from the
familiar premise that (broad) culpability is a precondition for the legitimate
imposition of criminal punishment, Ferzan turns attention in her sole-authored
article, Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing, '
to a very different respect in which such culpability arguably matters to the
criminal law-namely, by helping to ground the permissibility of the use of
defensive force.
As Ferzan explains, theorists of self-defense have tended increasingly to
emphasize a conceptual and normative distinction between whether it is
permissible for an actor to use defensive force against an actual or perceived
attacker and whether the person against whom defensive force is used has made
himself liable to the use of defensive force by another. Although Ferzan
acknowledges that liability might not be necessary to ground permissibility-that
is, an actor might have non-liability-based permission to use defensive force-she
believes that liability often does ground permissibility and, furthermore, that it is
an importantly distinctive ground of permissibility. For example, whether
permissibility is grounded in liability or alternative considerations might generate
different consequences for such matters as whether third parties may or must
intervene, and on whose side, and whether the person against whom defensive
force is used may deploy defensive force of his own.
While philosophers have increasingly accepted the cogency and value of a
liability/permissibility distinction, they have not coalesced on any single theory of
what makes an actor liable to the use of defensive force by another. Accordingly,
Ferzan explicates two prominent accounts of liability-those advanced,
respectively, by Judith Jarvis Thomson and by Jeff McMahan-and subjects each
to powerful and sophisticated criticism. She then develops and defends her own
alternative account in which culpability is a necessary condition of liability.
The principal reasons why we do or should care about blameworthiness have
been mostly implicit in my discussion so far. Let me finally make them more
explicit. We care about blameworthiness because of its relationship to desert.
Plausibly, one's negative desert is a function of one's blameworthiness, perhaps
among other things. We care about negative desert for two principal reasons.
First, retributivism maintains, to a first and necessarily rough approximation, that
criminal punishment is justified in terms of or by reference to an offender's
negative desert. Second, many of those who do not accept that negative desert
provides any affirmative justification for punishment, and would instead justify
punishment by reference to its projected good consequences, nonetheless accept
16 Id. at 197.
17 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive
Killing, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 669 (2012).
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that (presumptively or conclusively) the state may not seek to achieve good
consequences by punishing those whom it knows or believes to lack negative
desert, or in excess of their negative desert. This position is frequently termed
weak retributivism, negative retributivism, or side-constrained consequentialism."
In the final article of this symposium, Against Theories of Punishment: The
Thought of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, 9 Marc DeGirolami challenges the
systematizing impulse or commitment that leads today's theorists and scholars of
punishment overwhelmingly to classify and label justificatory accounts of
punishment along such lines as I have just outlined. DeGirolami presses his case
against the modem theorist's drive toward tidy classifications in surprising, even
striking, fashion: through a learned examination of the work of the nineteenth
century English judge and scholar James Fitzjames Stephen, and of Stephen's
subsequent treatment by the scholarly community.
The devil is very much in the details of DeGirolami's illuminating study of
Stephen. However, the gist is that Stephen's own work was subtle and complex,
involving unexpected mixtures of disparate elements, and that it has been deeply
misunderstood by following generations. To illustrate: DeGirolami shows that
scholars over the years have divided almost evenly over the seemingly basic
question of whether Stephen was a retributivist or a consequentialist. In fact,
DeGirolami argues, he was both-and therefore neither. And the principal reason
scholars have failed so thoroughly to grasp Stephen's nuanced views, DeGirolami
concludes, "has been exactly the effort to pin down Stephen's ideas about
punishment as retributivist, or consequentialist, or a specific hybrid. The drive to
systematize Stephen's thought has had the regrettable effect of flattening it, in
some cases unrecognizably." 20
Ultimately, as I have suggested, DeGirolami's interest is not only, or even
principally, in Stephen. This work of this interesting and idiosyncratic Victorian
jurist is worth our attention mostly, DeGirolami offers, because of what it might
teach about punishment theory in the twenty-first century. Today's punishment
theory, he says, "is a complex, variegated, technical, and increasingly fragmented
enterprise." 2 1 No doubt, the move toward increasing precision and philosophical
sophistication has produced benefits. But, DeGirolami warns, it also comes with
costs. To the extent that intellectual history and philosophy are partners in shared
project, he maintains, the methodological commitments prevalent in today's
punishment theory might obscure as much as they reveal.
18 For elaboration on these thumbnail sketches, see Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of
Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Andrei Marmor ed.,
forthcoming 2012).
19 Marc 0. DeGirolami, Against Theories ofPunishment: The Thought ofSir James Fitzjames
Stephen, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 699 (2012).
2o Id. at 699.
21 Id. at 747.
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For a punishment theorist of a "systematizing" bent, DeGirolami's conclusion
constitutes a mildly dispiriting note on which to end this Introduction. Of course,
it is a separate question whether, dispiriting or not, the conclusion is correct.
Possibly, the other articles in this wide-ranging and thought-provoking symposium
might go some small distance toward either substantiating or undermining
DeGirolami's bold thesis. Whether they do-and, if they do, how they point-I
leave for the reader to decide.
